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I. INTRODUCTION
Wall Street has achieved a remarkable political comeback from
the financial crisis of 2007–2009. Public anger over bailouts of
large financial institutions spurred Congress to pass the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DoddFrank) in July 2010.1 Megabanks, however, used their political
influence to weaken Dodd-Frank’s provisions,2 and they have
pursued a determined campaign since 2010 to undermine DoddFrank’s implementation.3
A primary goal of Dodd-Frank is to end “too big to fail” (TBTF)
treatment for systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs)
During the debates over Dodd-Frank,
and their creditors.4
however, Wall Street defeated two major initiatives that would
have threatened megabanks’ TBTF status. First, Wall Street’s
political allies voted down a proposed amendment by Senators
Sherrod Brown and Ted Kaufman, which would have forced a
1 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank]. For discussions of high-risk activities by large
financial firms that precipitated the financial crisis, as well as the federal government’s
bailouts of financial giants and the public anger that followed, see generally ALAN S. BLINDER,
AFTER THE MUSIC STOPPED: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, THE RESPONSE, AND THE WORK AHEAD
(2013); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to
the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 957–84, 1026–28 (2011) [hereinafter
Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank]; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington
Keeps Giving in to Wall Street, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1290–93, 1345–66 (2013) [hereinafter
Wilmarth, Blind Eye]; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., A Two-Tiered System of Regulation Is Needed
to Preserve the Viability of Community Banks and Reduce the Risks of Megabanks, 2015 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 249, 256–76 [hereinafter Wilmarth, Two-Tiered System].
2 See, e.g., Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 1029–34 (describing the financial
industry’s success in weakening the Volcker Rule and the Lincoln Amendment prior to
Dodd-Frank’s passage).
3 See Wilmarth, Blind Eye, supra note 1, at 1296–1312 (describing the financial industry’s
lobbying and litigation that undermined Dodd-Frank’s implementation between July 2010 and
mid-2013); Wilmarth, Two-Tiered System, supra note 1, at 323–32 (discussing the financial
industry’s continued campaign to obstruct Dodd-Frank’s implementation between mid-2013
and the end of 2014); Adam Davidson, Wall Street Is Using the Power of Dodd-Frank Against
Itself, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 27, 2015, http:// www.nytimes.com/2015/05/31/magazine/wall-str
eet-is-using-the-power-of-dodd-frank-itself.html (describing lobbying and litigation and a
“myriad [of] other ways” in which Wall Street has worked “to change the letter of [DoddFrank] so as to alter its spirit”).
4 Dodd-Frank, 124 Stat. at 1376 (preamble).
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breakup of the six largest U.S. banks.5 Second, Wall Street’s allies
blocked proposals that would have required the largest financial
institutions to pay risk-based premiums to prefund the Orderly
Liquidation Fund (OLF).6 As discussed below, the OLF provides
funding for resolving failed SIFIs under Title II of Dodd-Frank.7
Due to Wall Street’s success in defeating the prefunding proposals,
the OLF currently has a zero balance and must rely on borrowings
from the Treasury Department (Treasury) and, ultimately,
taxpayers.8
Large financial conglomerates (frequently called “universal
banks”) are determined to defend their current business model,
which relies on government protection of depositors and “shadow
banking” creditors to ensure low-cost funding for their speculative
capital markets activities.9 In December 2014, Wall Street’s
congressional allies succeeded in repealing the Lincoln
Amendment, which was enacted as Section 716 of Dodd-Frank.10
The Lincoln Amendment would have forced megabanks to incur
significant additional costs by transferring many of their
derivatives from their federally-insured bank subsidiaries to
nonbank affiliates.11 Wall Street’s determined campaign to repeal
the Lincoln Amendment “provides compelling evidence that Wall
Street’s business model depends on the ability of large financial
5 See, e.g., Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 1055 n.454 (discussing the defeat of
the Brown-Kaufman amendment, which would have imposed maximum size limits on large
financial institutions); Wilmarth, Blind Eye, supra note 1, at 1366.
6 See Arthur Wilmarth, Use Tiered Regulation to Preserve Small Banks, Keep Big Ones in
Line, AM. BANKER, Apr. 2, 2015, http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/use-tiered-regula
tion-to-protect-small-banks-keep-big-ones-in-line-1073578-1.html (discussing how Wall Street
and its allies successfully defeated proposals to prefund the OLF).
7 See infra notes 92–101 and accompanying text (discussing the OLF).
8 Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 999, 1015–18.
9 See infra Parts III.A.2, III.B.1 (describing how universal banks use governmentsubsidized funding to support their capital markets activities); see also infra note 165 and
accompanying text (discussing the determination of top executives of global megabanks to
maintain the universal banking model); Zoltan Pozsar et al., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y.,
STAFF REPORT NO. 458, SHADOW BANKING 22–33, 46–64 (2010), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1645337 (describing how the “shadow banking” system provides “shadow
bank deposits” to finance the activities of U.S. and foreign megabanks and how federal
agencies protected shadow banking creditors during the financial crisis).
10 See Wilmarth, supra note 6.
11 Wilmarth, Two-Tiered System, supra note 1, at 329–32.
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conglomerates to keep exploiting the cheap funding provided by
their ‘too big to fail’ subsidies . . . .”12
This Article focuses on a key strategy adopted by Wall Street to
preserve the universal banking model and its TBTF privileges.
The financial industry has promoted the “single point of entry”
(SPOE) plan for resolving failures of SIFIs under Title II of DoddFrank.13 That plan has attracted the support of U.S. and foreign
regulators.14 As shown below, Wall Street’s SPOE plan would
ensure future bailouts for SIFIs and their short-term creditors
while imposing the costs of those bailouts on ordinary investors
and taxpayers.15
Title II of Dodd-Frank establishes the Orderly Liquidation
Authority (OLA) to resolve failures of SIFIs.16 Under the OLA, the
Treasury Secretary may appoint the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) as receiver for a failing financial company if
the failure of that company would have “serious adverse effects on
financial stability,” and if “no viable private sector alternative is
available to prevent” the company’s collapse.17 Title II requires
the FDIC to liquidate a failed SIFI while imposing losses on its
shareholders and creditors.18 Title II’s liquidation-only mandate
threatens the TBTF subsidy for SIFIs,19 and it therefore presents a

12 Rob Blackwell, Why Citi May Soon Regret Its Big Victory on Capitol Hill, AM. BANKER,
Dec. 11, 2014, http://www.americanbanker.com/news/law-regulation/why-citi-may-soon-regr
et-its-big-victory-on-capitol-hill-1071636-1.html (quoting my description of Wall Street’s
motivation for repealing Section 716 of Dodd-Frank).
13 See Martin J. Gruenberg, Acting Chair, FDIC, Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago Bank Structure Conference (May 10, 2012), available at https://www.fdic.gov/news/
news/speeches/archives/2012/spmay1012.html (describing SPOE as “the most promising
resolution strategy” for dealing with the failure of a global SIFI).
14 E.g., FDIC & THE BANK OF ENGLAND, RESOLVING GLOBALLY ACTIVE, SYSTEMICALLY
IMPORTANT, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (2012), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/
publications/Documents/news/2012/nr156.pdf.
15 See infra Part II.C (describing how SPOE would ensure future bailouts for Wall Street
creditors and impose losses on ordinary investors and taxpayers).
16 See Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 204(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1454 (2010) (describing
the purpose of the OLF).
17 Dodd-Frank §§ 202(a), 203(b).
18 See infra notes 23–28 and accompanying text (discussing Title II’s liquidation-only
mandate).
19 See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 2 (2010).
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direct challenge to the universal banking model. To meet that
challenge, Wall Street embraced the SPOE resolution approach.
As explained in Part II of this Article, the FDIC’s early
rulemakings under Title II indicated that the FDIC would comply
with OLA’s liquidation-only mandate by breaking up failed SIFIs
through structured asset sales. The financial industry, however,
responded by advocating the SPOE plan, which would place only
the parent holding company of a failed SIFI in receivership while
maintaining its operating subsidiaries as going concerns. Shortterm creditors of the holding company and all creditors of the
operating subsidiaries would be fully protected. The protected
creditors would include uninsured depositors and shadow banking
creditors with close connections to Wall Street.
The financial industry’s SPOE plan relies on a two-part funding
strategy to guarantee continued protection for Wall Street. First,
the parent holding company of each SIFI would issue long-term
“bail-in” bonds. The FDIC would convert bail-in bonds into equity
when a SIFI fails, thereby imposing losses on bail-in bondholders
as well as shareholders. SIFIs would market and sell bail-in bonds
to non-systemic investors, including mutual funds and pension
funds that invest the savings of ordinary individuals.
Second, if write-offs of bail-in bonds are not sufficient to
recapitalize a failed SIFI and its operating subsidiaries, SPOE
would use the OLF’s authority to borrow from Treasury. OLF
loans—which are ultimately backstopped by taxpayers—would
support the failed SIFI’s operating subsidiaries and provide full
protection to short-term creditors of the parent holding company
and all creditors of the operating subsidiaries. At the end of the
OLA process, a new, cleaned-up SIFI would emerge that closely
resembles the failed SIFI, except for the losses imposed on the
failed SIFI’s shareholders and bail-in bondholders. Thus, contrary
to Title II’s explicit mandate, SPOE would reorganize, rather than
liquidate, failed SIFIs and would also guarantee bailouts for Wall
Street creditors while imposing the costs of those bailouts on
ordinary investors and taxpayers.
Supporters contend that SPOE could provide significant
benefits by maintaining the operating subsidiaries of a failed SIFI
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as going concerns and by facilitating cross-border cooperation
among domestic and foreign regulators when a global SIFI fails. It
is highly doubtful, however, whether those assumed advantages
would be realized in fact. Moreover, SPOE’s alleged benefits do
not justify giving blanket protection to Wall Street creditors at the
expense of ordinary investors and taxpayers.
Although U.S. and foreign regulators have not yet formally
adopted SPOE, it appears very likely that they will do so. Given
that reality, Part III of this Article proposes two reforms to reduce
the TBTF subsidy inherent in SPOE. First, SIFIs should pay riskadjusted premiums to prefund the OLF at a level of $300 billion or
more. The prefunded OLF should be used to cover the costs of
resolving a failed SIFI after the FDIC has written off investments
by shareholders, holders of subordinated debt, and qualifying
holders of bail-in bonds.20 Prefunding the OLF would help to
protect taxpayers from bearing the costs of resolving failed SIFIs.
In addition, risk-adjusted OLF premiums would (1) force SIFIs to
internalize at least some of the systemic risks they create and (2)
encourage SIFIs to follow more prudent operating strategies and
adopt less complex business structures.
As part of their OLF premiums, SIFIs should pay special fees
on their uninsured deposits and shadow banking liabilities. Under
SPOE, those deposits and liabilities would receive full protection
and would enjoy a status similar to insured deposits. The required
fees should be comparable to risk-based deposit insurance
premiums and should encourage SIFIs to establish more stable,
longer-term funding structures.
Second, SIFIs should pay at least half of their compensation to
senior executives and other key employees in the form of
contingent convertible bonds (CoCos), a type of bail-in debt.
Insiders should be required to hold their CoCos, without any

20 To prevent SIFIs from misleading ordinary investors, this Article proposes that SIFIs
should be barred from selling bail-in bonds to ordinary individuals, retail mutual funds, or
pension funds unless those bonds are explicitly described and marketed as “subordinated
debt” that is junior to all general creditor claims. More complex forms of bail-in bonds should
be sold only to sophisticated, wealthy individuals and asset managers who do not control funds
invested by ordinary individuals. See infra notes 87–90 and accompanying text.
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hedging, for a significant period of time after their employment
ends. CoCos would expose insiders to immediate losses if their
SIFIs were to fail during their employment or during their postemployment holding period. CoCos would encourage insiders of
SIFIs to forgo speculative ventures and adopt sustainable, longterm business strategies that are more closely aligned with the
interests of long-term creditors, the FDIC, and taxpayers.
II. SPOE WOULD PRESERVE TBTF TREATMENT FOR SIFIS AND
WALL STREET CREDITORS WHILE IMPOSING LOSSES ON ORDINARY
INVESTORS AND TAXPAYERS
A. IN ITS EARLY RULEMAKINGS UNDER TITLE II, FDIC RECOGNIZED
DODD-FRANK’S LIQUIDATION-ONLY MANDATE

Title II of Dodd-Frank establishes the OLA to provide an
orderly process for resolving failed SIFIs. Congress intended that
the OLA would provide a “viable alternative” to a “bailout . . . that
would expose taxpayers to losses and undermine market
discipline.”21 Title II’s blueprint for resolving failed SIFIs is
similar to the FDIC’s resolution regime for failed depository
institutions.22
Title II requires that a financial company placed in an OLA
receivership must be liquidated and any losses from the
liquidation must be imposed on the company’s shareholders and

S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 4 (2010).
See RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW
OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 485–523 (5th ed. 2013) (describing the FDIC’s resolution
regime for failed banks); see also Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Implementing Certain
Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 64,173, 64,175 (proposed Oct. 19, 2010) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380) [hereinafter FDIC Proposed OLA Rule] (“Parties who are
familiar with the liquidation of insured depository institutions under the [Federal Deposit
Insurance] Act . . . will recognize many parallel provisions in Title II.”); Orderly Liquidation
Authority Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
76 Fed. Reg. 4207, 4209 (Jan. 25, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380) [hereinafter
FDIC Interim OLA Rule] (restating the premise from the FDIC Proposed OLA Rule
regarding “parallel provisions in Title II”).
21
22
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creditors.23 Section 214(a) declares that “[a]ll financial companies
put into receivership under [Title II] shall be liquidated,” and “[n]o
taxpayer funds shall be used to prevent the liquidation of any
financial company under [Title II].”24 Thus, Dodd-Frank creates a
liquidation-only mandate, as explained in the Senate committee
report:
Once a failing financial company is placed under [an
OLA receivership], liquidation is the only option; the
failing financial company may not be kept open or
rehabilitated.
The financial company’s business
operations and assets will be sold off or liquidated, the
culpable management of the company will be
discharged, shareholders will have their investments
wiped out, and unsecured creditors and counterparties
will bear losses.25
Congress did not want a failed SIFI to emerge from an OLA
proceeding as a “rehabilitated” SIFI.26 Instead, Congress expected
that a failed SIFI would be broken up into smaller companies or its
assets would be sold so that the result of an OLA receivership
would be a reduced level of systemic risk.27 Title II’s liquidationonly mandate is a key component of Dodd-Frank’s declared
purpose “to end ‘too big to fail’ ” and “to protect the American
taxpayer by ending bailouts.”28
The FDIC recognized the liquidation-only mandate in its early
rulemakings under Title II. In late 2010 and early 2011, the FDIC
issued proposed and interim rules, which affirmed that “a
liquidation under the Dodd-Frank Act is a liquidation of the

23 Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 204(a)(1), 206(2)–(3), 214(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1454,
1459, 1518 (2010).
24 Id. § 214(a).
25 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 4 (emphasis added).
26 Id.
27 Id. at 2, 4.
28 Dodd-Frank, 124 Stat. at 1376 (preamble); see also S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 2 (2010) (to
accomplish Dodd-Frank’s stated goal of ending TBTF, the statute creates “a mechanism to
liquidate [SIFIs] should they fail without any losses to the taxpayer”).
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[financial] company that imposes the losses on its creditors and
shareholders . . . while ensuring that taxpayers bear none of the
costs.”29 Both rules stated that the FDIC could establish a bridge
financial company (BFC) to “continue key operations, services, and
transactions that will maximize the value of [a failed SIFI’s] assets
and avoid a disorderly collapse in the market place.”30 However,
the rules also said that a BFC would be employed only as a
temporary expedient until the FDIC could arrange an orderly sale
of the SIFI’s assets to third parties.31 The following statements
from the rulemakings indicated that the FDIC would use a BFC to
accomplish, not circumvent, the liquidation-only mandate:
[T]he FDIC is given broad authority under the DoddFrank Act to operate or liquidate the business, sell the
assets, and resolve the liabilities of a covered financial
company immediately after its appointment as
receiver or as soon as conditions make this
appropriate. This authority will enable the FDIC to
act immediately to sell assets of the covered financial
company to another entity or, if that is not possible, to
an FDIC-created bridge financial company while
maintaining critical functions . . . .
. . . Once the new [BFC]’s operations have stabilized
as the market recognizes that it has adequate funding
and will continue key operations, the FDIC would
move as expeditiously as possible to sell operations
and assets back into the private sector.32
Thus, the FDIC’s early rulemakings were consistent with Title
II’s liquidation-only mandate. The rulemakings did specify that
29 FDIC Proposed
note 22, at 4209.
30 FDIC Proposed
note 22, at 4209.
31 FDIC Proposed
note 22, at 4209.
32 FDIC Proposed
note 22, at 4210.

OLA Rule, supra note 22, at 64,175; FDIC Interim OLA Rule, supra
OLA Rule, supra note 22, at 64,175; FDIC Interim OLA Rule, supra
OLA Rule, supra note 22, at 64,175; FDIC Interim OLA Rule, supra
OLA Rule, supra note 22, at 64,176; FDIC Interim OLA Rule, supra
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the FDIC could give preferential treatment to certain short-term
creditors to preserve crucial operations of failed SIFIs.
In
contrast, the FDIC stated that it would never provide such
treatment to holders of debt securities with maturities of more
than 360 days.33 In response to the FDIC’s early rulemakings,
many critics argued that the FDIC should not favor the same types
of short-term Wall Street creditors—including counterparties
under derivatives and securities repurchase agreements—whose
As
reckless behavior contributed to the financial crisis.34
discussed below in Parts II.C.1 and III.A.2, the SPOE plan creates
similar concerns that the FDIC will give preferential treatment to
Wall Street creditors when SIFIs fail.
B. THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY DEVELOPED SPOE TO EVADE DODDFRANK’S LIQUIDATION-ONLY MANDATE AND TO GUARANTEE
PROTECTION FOR WALL STREET CREDITORS

During the FDIC’s consideration of its early OLA rules, two
leading Wall Street trade associations—the Securities Industries
and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) and the Clearing
House Association (TCH)—developed a very different strategy for
resolving failed SIFIs.
Wall Street’s strategy—called
“recapitalization-within-resolution”—provided a roadmap for
reorganizing failed SIFIs instead of liquidating them.35 In a
33 FDIC Proposed OLA Rule, supra note 22, at 64,177–78; FDIC Interim OLA Rule, supra
note 22, at 4211–12. In July 2011, the FDIC adopted a final rule that reaffirmed its
intention to provide preferential treatment to short-term creditors while denying similar
treatment to holders of long-term debt securities. See Certain Orderly Liquidation
Authority Provisions Under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,626, 41,634, 41,644 (July 15, 2011) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
380) [hereinafter FDIC Final OLA Rule].
34 FDIC Final OLA Rule, supra note 33, at 41,627, 41,634 (noting that many
commentators objected to the FDIC’s plan to favor short-term creditors over long-term
creditors); FDIC Interim OLA Rule, supra note 22, at 4211–12 (noting similar objections by
commentators to the FDIC’s plan); see also Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 998–99
(criticizing the FDIC’s plan to provide preferential treatment to short-term creditors
because it would “encourage SIFIs to rely even more heavily on vulnerable, short-term
funding strategies that led to repeated disasters during the financial crisis”).
35 Randall D. Guynn, Framing the TBTF Problem: The Path to a Solution, in ACROSS THE
GREAT DIVIDE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 281, 284 n.13 (Martin Neil
Baily & John B. Taylor eds., 2014), available at http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/acr
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comment letter submitted to the FDIC in May 2011, SIFMA and
TCH argued that “recapitalizations” would be a “more effective”
approach for resolving a failed SIFI “during a financial panic than
a liquidation of financial assets or the sale of a troubled or
insolvent SIFI to a third party.”36
Wall Street’s strategy provided the conceptual foundation for
SPOE.37 In a May 2012 speech, FDIC Chair Martin Gruenberg
described SPOE as “the most promising resolution strategy” for
dealing with the failure of a global SIFI.38 Mr. Gruenberg
explained that SPOE would “place the parent [holding] company
into receivership and . . . pass its assets, principally investments in
its subsidiaries, to a newly created bridge holding company. This
will allow subsidiaries . . . to remain open and avoid the disruption
that would likely accompany their closings.”39
In December 2012, the FDIC and the Bank of England (BoE)
identified SPOE as a desirable approach for resolving failures of
global SIFIs. The FDIC and the BoE argued that SPOE would
work well for global SIFIs because, “[b]y taking control of the SIFI
at the top of the group, subsidiaries (domestic and foreign)
carrying out critical services can remain open and operating,
limiting the need for destabilizing insolvency proceedings at the
SPOE could also reduce cross-border
subsidiary level.”40
complications because the primary supervisor of a failed SIFI
would control the resolution process at the “holding company level”
while avoiding “foreign insolvency proceedings” for subsidiaries
located in other countries.41
oss-the-great-divide-ch13.pdf (stating that Mr. Guynn, a partner and the head of the
Financial Institutions Group at Davis Polk & Wardwell, helped SIFMA and TCH to develop
their “recapitalization-within-resolution” plan for dealing with failed SIFIs).
36 Letter from Kenneth E. Bentsen, Jr., Exec. Vice President of Pub. Policy & Advocacy, Sec.
Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, & Mark Zingale, Senior Vice President & Assoc. Gen. Counsel, The
Clearing House Ass’n, to Robert E. Feldman, Exec. Sec’y, FDIC 2 (May 23, 2011), available at
http://www.sifma.org/ issues/itemaspx?id=25639.
37 Guynn, supra note 35, at 284 n.13.
38 Gruenberg, supra note 13.
39 Id.
40 FDIC & THE BANK OF ENGLAND, supra note 14, at 6.
41 Id. at 11; see also Martin Gruenberg & Paul Tucker, Op-Ed., When Global Banks Fail,
Resolve Them Globally, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2012, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/fd66d172-3fd4-
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While endorsing the SPOE concept, the FDIC and the BoE
indicated that the final outcome of a SPOE resolution would be a
liquidation of the failed SIFI. The agencies stated that SPOE’s
“top-down resolution” would be followed by “significant
restructuring” that could include “shrinking the [SIFI’s] balance
sheet, breaking the company up into smaller entities, and/or
selling or closing certain operations.”42
In December 2013, the FDIC presented a detailed SPOE
proposal in a public call for comments.43 Consistent with Wall
Street’s plan, the FDIC’s proposal would put a failed SIFI’s parent
holding company into an OLA receivership while transferring its
operating subsidiaries to a newly-formed BFC.44 The FDIC would
wipe out the equity interests of the SIFI’s shareholders and
convert the claims of the SIFI’s long-term bondholders into equity
interests in the BFC.45 The failed SIFI’s operating subsidiaries
(including banks, securities broker-dealers, and insurance
companies) would continue to operate without interruption under
the BFC’s control, and the rights of creditors of those subsidiaries
would not be impaired.46
After completing an SPOE resolution, the FDIC would approve
a “restructuring” plan to transfer the operating subsidiaries from
the BFC to one or more successor companies.47 The FDIC
explained that “restructuring might result in the [BFC] being
divided into several companies or parts of entities being sold to
third parties,” and “the [BFC] might become smaller and less
complex.”48 The FDIC’s repeated use of the word “might” rather
than “will,” when discussing asset transfers and sales, indicated a

11e2-b0c3-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3rjlxII58 (explaining that, under SPOE, “subsidiaries
(domestic and foreign) would be kept open and operating, thereby limiting contagion effects
and cross-border complications”).
42 FDIC & THE BANK OF ENGLAND, supra note 14, at 9.
43 Notice of Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions: The Single Point
of Entry Strategy, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,614 (Dec. 18, 2013) [hereinafter FDIC SPOE Proposal].
44 Id. at 76,616.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 76,620.
48 Id. (emphasis added).
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possible weakening of the FDIC’s commitment to a liquidationonly approach.
Five
leading
financial
industry
trade
associations
enthusiastically endorsed the FDIC’s SPOE proposal.49 The same
groups rejected criticism of the proposal by former Federal Reserve
Board Chair Paul Volcker. Mr. Volcker observed that SPOE
looked “more like a reorganization under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code than a liquidation as required by Title II [of
Dodd-Frank].”50 I and other commentators agreed with Mr.
Volcker’s view that SPOE did not appear to be consistent with
Title II’s liquidation-only mandate.51
The Wall Street trade groups claimed that Title II would permit
an SPOE strategy that “treats claimants as consistently as
possible with how they would have been treated in a successful
reorganization under the Bankruptcy Code.”52 In fact, however, as
49 See Letter from John Court, Managing Dir. & Senior Assoc. Gen. Counsel, The
Clearing House et al., to Robert E. Feldman, Exec. Sec’y, FDIC (Feb. 18, 2014) [hereinafter
2014 Wall Street SPOE Letter], available at https://www.theclearinghouse.org/~/media/Fi
les/Association%20Documents/20140218%20Single%20Point%20of%20Entry%20Comment
%20Letter.pdf (letter from TCH, SIFMA, the American Bankers Association, the Financial
Services Roundtable, and the Global Financial Markets Association). TCH had previously
issued a report advocating the SPOE strategy. THE CLEARING HOUSE, ENDING “TOO-BIGTO-F AIL ”: TITLE II OF THE D ODD-FRANK A CT AND THE APPROACH OF “S INGLE POINT OF
ENTRY” P RIVATE SECTOR RECAPITALIZATION OF A F AILED F INANCIAL COMPANY (2013)
[hereinafter 2013 TCH SPOE Report), available at https://www.theclearinghouse.org/~/med
ia/Files/Association%20Documents/20130117%20Title%20II%20and%20Single%20Point%20
of%20Entry%20White%20Paper.pdf.
50 2014 Wall Street SPOE Letter, supra note 49, at 25 & n.90 (summarizing Mr. Volcker’s
argument); see also Joe Adler, Is the FDIC’s ‘Single-Point’ Resolution Plan a Stealth
Bailout?, AM. BANKER, Dec. 13, 2013, available at 2013 WLNR 31174108 (quoting Mr.
Volcker’s opinion that SPOE “ ‘doesn’t sound like a liquidation’ ”).
51 See, e.g., Adler, supra note 50 (quoting my statement that “[SPOE] doesn’t look like a
liquidation. It looks like a . . . reorganization in which the systemically important financial
institution survives to fight another day.”); Who Is Too Big to Fail: Does Title II of the DoddFrank Act Enshrine Taxpayer-Funded Bailouts?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight &
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 113th Cong. 3 (2013) (statement of David A.
Skeel, Jr.), http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-113-ba09-wstate-dskeeel-201
30515.pdf (“[A]lthough Title II explicitly requires that its provisions be used for liquidation,
[single point of entry] is essentially a reorganization. It thus stands in tension with the
explicit requirements of Title II.”).
52 2014 Wall Street SPOE Letter, supra note 49, at 26 (emphasis added).
The trade
groups did not cite any provision of Title II that explicitly requires treatment for creditors
similar to a reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The groups did,
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the groups acknowledged, Title II only requires that creditors
receive “at least as much value in satisfaction of their claims as
they would have received in a liquidation under Chapter 7 of the
To bolster their argument for a
Bankruptcy Code.”53
reorganization strategy, the Wall Street groups asserted that
dissolving a failed SIFI’s parent holding company would be
sufficient to satisfy the liquidation-only mandate.54 They also
contended that Title II does not require any restructuring of
operating subsidiaries after they are transferred to a BFC.55
Other Wall Street supporters maintained that Title II would allow
a BFC and its operating subsidiaries to emerge intact as a “new
financial holding company” following an SPOE resolution.56
Thus, Wall Street’s SPOE plan contemplates little or no
restructuring at the holding company level or the subsidiary level
after the FDIC has transferred operating subsidiaries from a failed
SIFI’s parent holding company to a BFC. Wall Street obviously
prefers a reorganization strategy that would convert a failed SIFI
into a new, cleaned-up SIFI with a minimum of structural

however, assert that a “duty” to provide such treatment could be “implied” from Title II’s
overall purpose to “avoid or mitigate” the potential for “serious adverse effects on financial
stability in the United States.” Id. at 26 n.97.
53 Id. at 26 (citing Dodd-Frank §§ 210(a)(7)(B), (d)(2)(B)).
54 Id. at 25.
55 Id. at 25, 27; see also Guynn, supra note 35, at 291 (“[T]he duty to liquidate only
applies to the financial company that is actually put into a Title II receivership. Under the
SPOE strategy, only the parent would be put into such a receivership.”).
56 Guynn, supra note 35, at 295 (“In the final step, the old bridge company becomes a new
financial holding company, fully in the private sector.”). The Bipartisan Policy Center, a
think tank that is widely viewed as a supporter of Wall Street, see infra note 62 and
accompanying text, has advocated the same outcome. JOHN F. BOVENZI ET AL., BIPARTISAN
POLICY CTR., TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE PATH TO A SOLUTION: A REPORT OF THE FAILURE
RESOLUTION TASK FORCE OF THE FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM INITIATIVE OF THE
BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER 31 (2013) [hereinafter 2013 BPC SPOE Report], available at
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/too-big-fail-path-solution-525 (stating that, at the end of
an SPOE resolution, “the bridge holding company would be converted into a normal stateor federally chartered corporation”); id. at 30 fig.7 (showing graphically how the BFC would
be converted into a new financial holding company). The principal authors of the 2013 BPC
SPOE Report were John Bovenzi (partner in the Oliver Wyman financial consulting firm),
Randall Guynn (head of Davis Polk’s financial institutions practice and originator of the
“recapitalization-within-resolution” concept), see supra note 35, and Thomas Jackson (a
leading bankruptcy law scholar). 2013 BPC SPOE Report, supra, at 82.
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changes.57 The extent to which the FDIC agrees with Wall Street’s
strategy remains unclear.58 The FDIC’s SPOE proposal stated,
however, that SPOE resolutions would use some of the same
claims procedures and accounting principles as are used in
Chapter 11 reorganizations under the Bankruptcy Code.59
57 Guynn, supra note 35, at 295–96; 2013 BPC SPOE Report, supra note 56, at 30–31. In
her comment letter on the FDIC’s SPOE proposal, former FDIC Chair Sheila Bair warned
that,
without further progress under Title I [of Dodd-Frank] to require U.S.
SIFIs to simplify and rationalize their legal structures, the most likely
outcome of the SPOE approach will be to replace one systemic firm with
another . . . . [T]his new firm . . . could still have the same name, many of
the same employees, and pose the same external risks to the system.
Adler, supra note 50, at 3 (quoting letter from Ms. Bair dated Feb. 18, 2014).
The financial industry has also advocated the enactment of a new “Chapter 14” of the
Bankruptcy Code, which would authorize federal bankruptcy courts to use an SPOE approach
for reorganizing insolvent financial holding companies. As I have described elsewhere, the
financial industry’s “Chapter 14” proposal contemplates even greater benefits for SIFIs and
their executives and Wall Street creditors than those parties would receive in an SPOE
resolution under Title II of Dodd-Frank. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Financial
Industry's Bankruptcy Plan for Resolving Failed Megabanks Would Give Unwarranted
Benefits to Their Executives and Wall Street Creditors, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Nov. 3, 2015),
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/11/03/the-financial-industrys-bankruptcy-plan-for-res
olving-failed-megabanks-would-give-unwarranted-benefits-to-their-executives-and-wall-streetcreditors/.
58 In his May 2012 speech, FDIC Chair Martin Gruenberg described SPOE as
a resolution strategy under which the FDIC takes control of the failed
[SIFI] at the parent holding company level and establishes a bridge holding
company as an interim step in the conversion of the failed [SIFI] into a new
well-capitalized private sector entity. We believe this strategy holds the
best possibility of . . . producing a new, viable private sector company out of
the process.
Gruenberg, supra note 13. Those remarks appear to be generally consistent with Wall
Street’s reorganization strategy. In another speech three years later, Mr. Gruenberg stated
that “the resolution process [under SPOE] would end with the termination of the bridge
financial company]” as well as “the wind-down of the [BFC] in a way that minimizes
systemic disruption.” Martin J. Gruenberg, Chair, FDIC, A Progress Report on the
Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions, Address to the Peterson Instit.
for Int’l Econ. (May 12, 2015), available at https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/spmay
1215.html. Mr. Gruenberg’s 2015 speech could be viewed as departing to some extent from
Wall Street’s reorganization strategy.
59 FDIC SPOE Proposal, supra note 43, at 76,618 (“[T]he FDIC intends to adapt certain
claims forms and practices applicable to a Chapter 11 proceeding under the Bankruptcy
code.”); see also id. at 76,619 (stating that the FDIC’s SPOE resolution process would follow
the “fresh start model” for accounting treatment that is “generally applied to companies
emerging from bankruptcy under Chapter 11”).
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C. WALL STREET’S SPOE STRATEGY WOULD ENSURE FUTURE
BAILOUTS FOR WALL STREET CREDITORS AND IMPOSE LOSSES ON
ORDINARY INVESTORS AND TAXPAYERS

1. SPOE Would Protect Wall Street Creditors of Failed SIFIs.
As shown in the preceding section, Wall Street’s SPOE plan would
allow a failed SIFI to be reorganized rather than liquidated, and it
would enable the SIFI’s successor holding company and former
operating subsidiaries to emerge intact as a new SIFI.60 Wall
Street’s version of SPOE would also maintain the operating
subsidiaries during the resolution process and protect their
creditors from any losses.61 In a May 2013 report, the Bipartisan
Policy Center (BPC)—a think tank that receives significant
funding from the financial industry and generally supports policies
favorable to Wall Street62—highlighted those outcomes as key
virtues of SPOE.63
Wall Street’s SPOE strategy strongly resembles the expedited
“Section 363” transactions that federal officials used to reorganize
Chrysler and General Motors (GM) under Chapter 11 of the
In the Chrysler case—on which the
Bankruptcy Code.64
60 Guynn, supra note 35, at 290–91, 295–96; 2013 BPC SPOE Report, supra note 56, at
26–28, 31–32.
61 Guynn, supra note 35, at 295–96; 2013 BPC SPOE Report, supra note 56, at 27–28.
62 See P UBLIC C ITIZEN , M ADE IN THE S HADE : A N E XAMINATION OF W HETHER THE
BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER IS TRULY NEUTRAL 6–7 (2013), available at http://www.citizen.
org/documents/biparisan-policy-center-neutrality-report.pdf (reporting that the American
Bankers Association and Citigroup were “major contributors” to BPC in 2012, and
describing BPC’s financial regulatory task force as an “industry dominated panel” because
most members had “clear ties to large banks”); Simon Johnson, The Dark Side of
Bipartisanship, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG, Oct. 25, 2012, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.c
om/2012/10/25/the-dark-side-of-bipartisanship/?_r=1 (“[T]he Bipartisan Policy Center seems
likely to side with industry lobby groups on all substantive questions.”); see also BIPARTISAN
P OLICY C TR ., 2014: ANNUAL R EPORT 54–55 (2015), available at http://bipartisanpol
icy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/BPC-2014-Annual-Report.pdf (listing the American
Bankers Association, American Express, Bank of America, BlackRock, Citigroup, Credit
Suisse, Fidelity Investments, Financial Services Forum, Financial Services Roundtable,
Goldman Sachs, Institute of International Bankers, MetLife, PNC Financial, Prudential,
The Clearing House, and Zurich Insurance Group among BPC’s corporate donors).
63 2013 BPC SPOE Report, supra note 56, at 23–32, 63–70.
64 Id. at 31, 33–34; see also David A. Skeel Jr., Single Point of Entry and the Bankruptcy
Alternative 15 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 14-10, 2014),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2408544 (observing that SPOE “bears a striking
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subsequent GM deal was modeled—the federal government (1)
created a shell company (similar to a BFC), (2) provided massive
funding to finance the shell company’s purchase of substantially
all of Chrysler’s assets, and (3) arranged for the shell company—
which became the “new” Chrysler—to assume responsibility for
claims held by favored creditors (including trade creditors and
beneficiaries under Chrysler’s pension and health care plans).
Meanwhile, the claims of disfavored creditors (including secured
bondholders, terminated dealers, and customers with product
liability claims) were left behind in the bankruptcy estate of “old”
Chrysler.65 As Mark Roe and David Skeel pointed out, the
Chrysler reorganization was highly controversial, and “[t]he
unevenness of the compensation to prior creditors raised
considerable concerns in capital markets.”66
Like the Chrysler transaction, Wall Street’s SPOE plan would
disfavor long-term bondholders of a failed SIFI’s parent holding
company while providing full protection to short-term creditors of
the holding company and all creditors of its operating subsidiaries.
The favored creditors would include uninsured depositors, holders
of commercial paper, and counterparties under derivatives and
securities repurchase agreements, many of whom are institutional
investors with close connections to Wall Street.67
resemblance” to the federal government’s restructuring of Chrysler and General Motors);
Stephen J. Lubben, OLA After Single Point of Entry: Has Anything Changed?, in AN
UNFINISHED MISSION: MAKING WALL STREET WORK FOR US 13, 13 (Mike Konczal & Marcus
Stanley, Americans for Fin. Reform & the Roosevelt Institute eds., 2013), available at http://
rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Unfinished_Mission_2013.pdf (noting that
SPOE uses “a process that is very much like that used in ‘363 sales’ under chapter 11, widely
publicized by the automotive bankruptcy cases”).
65 Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. REV. 727,
729–34, 765 (2010); Skeel, supra note 64, at 15; see also Adam Levitin, Single-Point-of-Entry:
No Bank Left Behind, CREDIT SLIPS (Aug. 31, 2014, 6:42 PM), http://www.creditslips.org/cred
itslips/2014/08/single-point-of-entry-no-bank-left-behind.html (explaining that, under SPOE,
as with the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies, “[t]he good assets and favored liabilities are
transferred to a new, government-backed entity, while the disfavored liabilities remain with
the old, liquidating entity”).
66 Roe & Skeel, supra note 65, at 770. For a contrasting and more favorable assessment
of the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies, see Stephen J. Lubben, No Big Deal: The GM and
Chrysler Cases in Context, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 531 (2009).
67 2013 BPC SPOE Report, supra note 56, at 28, 31; see also Levitin, supra note 65
(stating that under SPOE, “all of the derivative counterparties, all of the commercial paper
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2. Wall Street’s Funding Plan for SPOE Resolutions Would
Impose Losses on Ordinary Investors and Taxpayers. Wall Street’s
SPOE strategy relies on a two-part funding plan that would
protect Wall Street creditors at the expense of ordinary investors
and taxpayers. The first major funding source would be long-term
bail-in bonds issued by parent holding companies of SIFIs. When
a SIFI fails, the bail-in debt would be converted into equity to
capitalize the newly-formed BFC, to support the SIFI’s operating
subsidiaries, and to protect the creditors of those subsidiaries from
any losses.68
The Financial Stability Board (FSB) recently proposed that
global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) should be required
to issue long-term debt to provide “total loss-absorbing capacity”
(TLAC) for their resolution if they fail.69 The FSB’s TLAC
proposal would compel G-SIBs (the largest global SIFIs) to issue
long-term, unsecured debt that could be either written off or
converted into equity.
The proceeds from write-downs and
conversions of bail-in debt would be used to protect depositors and
other favored short-term creditors, including counterparties under
derivatives and securities repurchase agreements.70 A former
creditors, all of the repo counterparties, and all of the securities lending counterparties get
bailed out”).
68 Guynn, supra note 35, at 289–90, 292, 295–96; 2013 BPC SPOE Report, supra note 56, at
26–28, 31–32; 2013 TCH SPOE Report, supra note 49, at 6–7, 24–26; see also Charles
Goodhart & Emilios Avgouleas, A Critical Evaluation of Bail-ins as Bank Recapitalisation
Mechanisms 3–5, 7–9 (Ctr. for Econ. Policy, Research Discussion Paper 10065, 2014), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2478647 (describing the “bail-in” debt strategy advocated by SPOE
supporters); Michael Krimminger, Shadows and Mirrors: The Role of Debt in the Developing
Resolution Strategies in the U.S., U.K., and European Union 10–14, 20 (Dec. 30, 2014)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2560982 (outlining the “bailin” debt strategy).
69 Adequacy of Loss-Absorbing Capacity of Global Systemically Important Banks in
Resolution: Consultative Document, FIN. STABILITY BD. (Nov. 10, 2014) [hereinafter 2014
FSB TLAC Proposal], http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/TLAC-Con
doc-6-Nov-2014-FINAL.pdf; see also Krimminger, supra note 68, at 20–25 (describing the
FSB’s TLAC proposal); 2014 Update of List of Global Systemically Important Banks (GSIBs), FIN. STABILITY BD. (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/2014/11/20
14-update-of-list-of-global-systemically-important-banks (designating 30 G-SIBs, including
eight G-SIBs headquartered in the U.S.).
70 See Krimminger, supra note 68, at 20–25 (discussing the use of bail-in debt to satisfy
the FSB’s proposed TLAC requirement); see also 2014 FSB TLAC Proposal, supra note 69,
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FDIC General Counsel remarked that the FSB’s “TLAC proposal
was developed in the context of [the SPOE] strategy” and was
“designed to maintain systemically important operations in
subsidiaries” of failed G-SIBs.71
The FSB’s TLAC proposal would force global SIFIs to issue
hundreds of billions of dollars of bail-in debt.72 SIFIs would face
significant challenges in finding buyers for that debt. Regulators
agree that SIFIs should not sell bail-in bonds to other SIFIs
because cross-holdings of bail-in debt among large financial
institutions would increase the risks of contagion during a crisis.73
SIFIs could potentially sell bail-in debt to hedge funds and
private equity funds. Many of those funds, however, borrow large
amounts from SIFIs. Consequently, regulators might not be able
to impose bail-in debt losses on hedge funds or private equity
funds during a crisis due to concerns about their ability to repay
their loans to SIFIs.74

at 6–8, 13–20 (explaining the TLAC proposal). The FSB issued its final international TLAC
standard in November 2015, after the manuscript for this article had been completed. See
Press Release, Fin. Stability Bd., FSB Issues Final Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity Standard
for Global Systemically Important Banks (Nov. 9, 2015), available at http://www.financialst
abilityboard.org/2015/11/tlac-press-release/.
71 Krimminger, supra note 68, at 23; see also id. at 1 n.1, 23 (noting that the author, a
former FDIC General Counsel, “participated in the original discussions leading to the
suggestion of the SPOE approach”).
72 See John Glover, Bank Holding Company Bonds Fray as Traders Fret Over Risk,
BLOOMBERG, Nov. 27, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-27/bank-holdi
ng-company-bonds-fray-as-traders-fret-over-risk (reporting that G-SIBs already held “about
$650 billion of loss-absorbing bonds” but “[t]hat amount may have to almost double to meet
FSB requirements”); Ben Moshinsky, FSB’s Too-Big-to-Fail Bank Fix Seen Dragging on
Economy, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 2, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-03/fb
s-s-too-big-to-fail-fix-seen-dragging-on-economy (citing a Standard & Poor’s estimate that
the 30 G-SIBs designated by FSB would need to issue about $500 billion of additional
TLAC-eligible debt to meet the FSB’s proposed requirement).
73 Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor, Bank of Eng., Resolution and the Future of Finance,
Speech at the INSOL International World Congress (May 20, 2013), available at http://www.
bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2013/speech658.pdf; see also 2014 FSB
TLAC Proposal, supra note 69, at 12 (“To reduce the potential for a G-SIB resolution to spread
contagion into the global banking system, it will be important to strongly disincentivise
internationally active banks from holding TLAC issued by G-SIBs.”).
74 Avinash Persaud, Bail-ins Are No Better Than Fool’s Gold, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2013,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/686dfaa4-27a7-11e3-8feb-00144feab7de.html.
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Regulators are therefore likely to encourage SIFIs to sell bail-in
debt to non-systemic investors, including pension funds and
mutual funds.75 Major banks have already sold about $300 billion
of contingent convertible bonds (CoCos).76 CoCos are bail-in bonds
that automatically convert to equity upon the occurrence of one or
more designated events (such as the issuer’s insolvency).77 Banks
have successfully marketed CoCos to asset managers because of a
“hunt for yield” in a global debt market characterized by “ultra-low
interest rates.”78
Analysts have expressed growing concerns about the complexity
of CoCos and other bail-in bonds as well as the difficulty of
estimating losses that investors might suffer from bond writedowns or conversions into equity.79 In 2014 the U.K.’s Financial
Conduct Authority (FCA) barred U.K. banks from selling CoCos
directly to retail investors due to their “complex” and “highly

75 Id.; John Glover, Nicholas Comfort & Ben Moshinsky, Bank-Debt Buyers Won’t Sleep
Easily at Night on Write-Down Bonds, 104 BLOOMBERG BNA BANKING REP. 337 (2015); see
also Leonid Bershidsky, Hunt for Exotic Yields Is Dangerous, BLOOMBERG VIEW, Apr. 24,
2014, http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-04-24/hunt-for-exotic-yields-is-dangerous
(“The CoCo idea is fashionable among regulators . . . .”).
76 Christopher Thompson, Chinese Banks Issue Most Coco Bonds, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2015,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5a99b804-b135-11e4-9331-00144feab7de.html#axzz3s2aMHHSL
(“Banks have issued $288bn of cocos since the asset claim first appeared in 2009 . . . .”).
77 See generally Stefan Avdjiev, Anastasia Kartasheva & Bilyana Bogdanova, CoCos: A
Primer, 2013 BIS Q. REV. 43, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2326334 (providing an
overview of CoCos).
78 James Shotter, Deutsche Sells 10-Year Debt with 2.75% Coupon, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2015,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a1af5768-b076-11e4-9b8e-00144feab7de.html; see also Christopher
Thompson, Bank Debt Issuance Doubles to Record Levels, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2015, http://www.
ft.com/intl/cms/S/0/e64de99a-9ffd-11e4-aa89-00144feab7de.html (describing a strong demand for
CoCos due to a “voracious investor appetite for yield”); Bershidsky, supra note 75 (“Asset
managers have bought more than 60 percent of seven recent issues [of CoCos] by big banks” in a
market where investors were “[t]ortured by low interest rates . . . .”).
79 See Bershidsky, supra note 75 (“[I]nvestors may be underestimating the risks [of
CoCos,]. . . the scale of which is hard to pin down.”); Glover, Comfort & Moshinsky, supra note
75, at 337–38 (describing the uncertainty and risks inherent in bail-in bonds); Frances
Schwartzkopff, Bank Bail-In Extras Alarm Investors as Danske Eyes Debt, BLOOMBERG, Dec.
8, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-07-bank/bail-in-extras-alarm-invest
ors-as-danske-explores-new-debt (discussing concerns with the complexity and risks of bail-in
bonds).
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risky” features.80 The FCA and other regulators, however, have
allowed SIFIs to sell CoCos and other bail-in bonds to pension
funds and mutual funds that serve retail investors (retail mutual
funds), even though ordinary individuals would ultimately bear
any losses on those bonds.81
Selling bail-in debt to pension funds and retail mutual funds
would simply shift some of the costs of resolving failed SIFIs from
taxpayers to individual savers while protecting favored Wall
Street creditors.82 In his recent testimony before a House of Lords
subcommittee, HSBC chairman Douglas Flint argued that society
must bear the costs of resolving failed SIFIs, and he noted that
bail-in debt provides a method for “distributing the burden of
failure” from taxpayers to pensioners and retail investors.83 Mr.
Flint asserted, “At the end of the day, the burden of failure rests
with society. Whether you take it out of society’s future income
through taxation or whether you take it out through their pensions
or savings, society is bearing the cost.”84
Mr. Flint’s remarkable statement exposes the assumption of
megabank insiders that society—including taxpayers, pensioners,
and retail investors—must pay for the costs of resolving failed
80 Jenny Anderson, British Watchdog Curbs High-Yield Bonds Called CoCos for Small
Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2014, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/08/05/british-watchd
og-curbs-high-yield-bonds-called-cocos-for-small-investors (quoting Christopher Woolard,
the FCA’s director of policy, risk and research).
81 See Jeremy C. Jennings-Mares, CoCo No-Go for Ordinary Joe, MORRISON & FOERSTER 2
(Aug. 11, 2014), http://www.mofo.com/~/media/Files/ClientAlert/2014/08/140811CoCoNoGofor
OrdinaryJoe.pdf (explaining that the FCA’s ban on sales of CoCos to ordinary retail investors
would not prohibit sales of CoCos to pension funds and “regulated collective investment
scheme[s]” in which ordinary individuals hold “beneficial interests”); see also Bershidsky,
supra note 75 (contending that regulators are likely to place retail investors at risk by
allowing asset managers to buy CoCos).
82 See Goodhart & Avgouleas, supra note 68, at 24 (“[S]hifting from bail-out to bail-in
will . . . primarily transfer the burden of loss from one set of domestic players, the taxpayers, to another, the pensioners and savers.”).
83 U.K. House of Lords, Review of the EU Financial Regulatory Framework Before SubComm. A (Econ. & Fin. Affairs) of the Select Comm. on the Eur. Union of the U.K. House of
Lords (Oct. 21, 2014) (testimony of Douglas Flint) [hereinafter 2014 Flint Testimony],
available at http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocu
ment/eu-sub-a-economic-and-financial-affairs-committee/review-of-the-eu-financial-regulat
ory-framework/oral/14795.html.
84 Id. (emphasis added).
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SIFIs.85 He did not mention the possibility that SIFIs or their
insiders might bear any responsibility for excessive risk-taking.
Mr. Flint’s assertion reflects the prevailing attitude on Wall Street
and in the City of London before, during, and after the financial
crisis: SIFIs and their insiders should retain their profits and
bonuses from high-risk activities while governments and ordinary
citizens must bear the losses.86
As a matter of social equity, “pushing pensioners [and retail
investors] under the bus” to save SIFIs and their Wall Street
creditors is no more palatable than relying on taxpayers to finance
bailouts.87 Pensioners and retail investors do not have a superior
ability, compared with taxpayers, to evaluate the risks of SIFIs or
to bear the financial burden of bailing out SIFIs and their favored
creditors.88 Accordingly, regulators should prohibit SIFIs from
selling bail-in bonds to ordinary individuals, retail mutual funds,
and pension funds unless those bonds are explicitly marketed and
sold as “subordinated debt” that is junior to the claims of all
general creditors. SIFIs should be barred from selling bonds to
such investors that are designated as “senior” to subordinated debt
but contain high-risk, bail-in features.
SIFIs are already
concocting such instruments for the purpose of selling bail-in debt
with lower interest rates than subordinated debt.89

85 See James Titcomb, Mark Carney: No More Bank Bail-Outs, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 10,
2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/11220192/Mark-Car
ney-No-more-bank-bail-outs.html (“Douglas Flint, the chairman of HSBC, has said that bail-in
rules will still mean the public being on the hook for banks.”).
86 SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE
NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 12 (2010) (“The basic, massive subsidy scheme [for SIFIs]
remains unchanged: when times are good, the banks keep the upside as executive and
trader compensation; when times are bad and potential crisis looms, the government picks
up the bill.”); see also Wilmarth, Blind Eye, supra note 1, at 1394–97 (explaining how major
U.K. banks pushed for deregulation and “light touch” supervision, which ultimately led to a
massive crisis in which “U.K. authorities were forced to bail out four of the nine largest
U.K. banks”). See generally JOHNSON & KWAK, supra, at 10–12, 133–34, 150–74, 178–82
(describing the prevailing views on Wall Street before and during the financial crisis).
87 Persaud, supra note 74; accord Goodhart & Avgouleas, supra note 68, at 24.
88 Bershidsky, supra note 75; Goodhart & Avgouleas, supra note 68, at 24–25; Persaud,
supra note 74.
89 Christopher Thompson, Banks Engineer Lower-Cost Risk Capital, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 2,
2015, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7256ad46-aae4-11e4-81bc-00144feab7de.html#axzz3s2
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Prohibiting SIFIs from selling bail-in bonds, except for
subordinated debt, to ordinary investors would (1) greatly reduce
the risk of misleading those investors about the risks of bail-in
bonds and (2) require SIFIs to pay higher interest rates that would
more fairly compensate ordinary investors for the extraordinary
risks inherent in bail-in debt. SIFIs should sell more complex bailin bonds only to sophisticated, wealthy individuals and to
institutional investors who do not manage funds for ordinary
individuals. The foregoing restrictions might persuade SIFIs to
issue greater amounts of common stock and non-cumulative
perpetual preferred stock in order to satisfy the FSB’s proposed
TLAC requirement.90 That would be a highly desirable outcome.
Shareholders’ equity provides the most stable and durable source
of funding for financial institutions because shareholders cannot
force a SIFI to redeem their investments and cannot declare a
default if a SIFI is forced to suspend dividends to conserve its
capital.91
Wall Street’s SPOE plan relies on the Orderly Liquidation Fund
(OLF) as its second major funding source and ultimate backstop.
If the assets and bail-in bonds of a failed SIFI’s holding company
are not sufficient to capitalize the BFC and to cover the losses of
its operating subsidiaries, the FDIC would use the OLF to fill the
gap.92 Dodd-Frank does not establish a prefunding mechanism for
the OLF, and the OLF therefore has a zero balance.93 The FDIC,
however, can obtain immediate funding from the OLF by
a MHHSL (reporting that SIFIs “are looking for clever ways to lower the cost” of bail-in debt
by creating new types of bonds that “would incur losses in the event of a bank default but
pay out less in interest to creditors than dearer, existing subordinated bonds”).
90 See Glover, Comfort & Moshinsky, supra note 75 (describing the challenges faced by
megabanks in finding enough investors to purchase the bail-in bonds the banks must sell to
satisfy the FSB’s proposed TLAC requirement).
91 See CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 22, at 223–24 (describing common stock and
non-cumulative perpetual preferred stock). For a comprehensive analysis demonstrating that
regulators should require megabanks to operate with much lower levels of leverage and to
fund their operations with much higher levels of equity capital, see generally ANAT ADMATI &
MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKER’S NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO
DO ABOUT IT (2013).
92 See Dodd-Frank, Pub. No. 111-203, § 210(n), 124 Stat. 1376, 1506 (2010) (establishing
the OLF to finance liquidations of failed SIFIs under the OLA).
93 See infra notes 126–28 and accompanying text.
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borrowing from Treasury a total amount of up to 10% of a failed
SIFI’s assets during the first thirty days after the FDIC has been
appointed as receiver, plus 90% of the “fair value” of the failed
SIFI’s assets that become available to repay the OLF loan after the
first thirty days.94
The FDIC’s ability to borrow from Treasury provides “huge
amounts of funding” to protect favored creditors of SIFIs and their
operating subsidiaries.95 The fair value standard gives the FDIC
considerable leeway in determining how much it can borrow from
Treasury because it does not require the FDIC to use current
market prices in valuing a failed SIFI’s assets.96 Moreover, as
David Skeel has pointed out, Treasury loans for OLA resolutions
will have “generous” terms, including interest rates that “will
almost certainly be less than the penalty rate of interest called for
in traditional lender-of-last-resort lending.”97
The FDIC must ordinarily repay an OLF loan from Treasury
within five years.98 If the proceeds from resolving a failed SIFI are
insufficient to repay the loan, the FDIC must impose retroactive
assessments on large financial institutions to recover the
Treasury may, however, extend the FDIC’s
difference.99
repayment period indefinitely if such action is necessary “to avoid
a serious adverse effect on the financial system of the United
States.”100 During a future systemic crisis, it is likely that the
94 Dodd-Frank § 210(n)(5), (6).
In order to borrow funds from Treasury to finance a
resolution of a failed SIFI, the FDIC must enter into a repayment agreement with Treasury
after consulting with the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and
the House Committee on Financial Services. Id. § 210(n)(9).
95 Skeel, supra note 64, at 14, 17.
96 Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 999.
97 Skeel, supra note 64, at 14 (explaining that § 210(n)(5)(C) of Dodd-Frank authorizes
Treasury to charge interest rates on OLF loans based on “the average interest rates for a
basket of corporate bonds” of comparable maturity); see also Examining How the Dodd-Frank
Act Could Result in More Taxpayer-Funded Bailouts: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin.
Servs., 113th Cong. 72, 82 (2013) (statement of Richard W. Fisher, President and Chief Exec.
Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of Dallas), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hh
rg81769/pdf/CHRG-113hhrg81769.pdf (“Call it whatever you wish, but this is taxpayer
funding [for SPOE resolutions] at far-below-market rates.”).
98 Dodd-Frank §§ 210(n)(9)(B), (o)(1)(B).
99 Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 1015.
100 Dodd-Frank §§ 210(n)(9)(B), 210(o)(1)(B), (C).
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FDIC would request, and Treasury would approve, a prolonged
extension of the OLF repayment schedule, thereby postponing the
FDIC’s duty to impose assessments on surviving SIFIs. During
such a crisis—as was certainly true in 2008—many SIFIs would
not be strong enough to bear the additional burden of paying large
assessments, as they would be exposed to many of the same risks
that caused their peers to fail. Accordingly, OLF loans for SPOE
resolutions would frequently be extended far beyond the standard
five-year term and would represent lengthy, taxpayer-funded
bridge loans for the benefit of protected SIFI creditors.101
Thus, Wall Street’s SPOE plan would provide “a stealth bailout”
for favored creditors of failed SIFIs and their operating
subsidiaries because bail-in bondholders (i.e., ordinary investors)
and OLF loans (i.e., taxpayers) would bear the burden of
protecting those creditors.102 Many favored creditors of failed
SIFIs and their operating subsidiaries would be institutional
investors with close connections to Wall Street, including holders
of uninsured deposits, commercial paper, securities repurchase
agreements, and other shadow banking liabilities.103 As Adam
Levitin has observed, SPOE “ensures that Wall Street [creditors]
will be rescued if a SIFI goes down.”104
When the FDIC released its SPOE proposal, FDIC Vice Chair
Thomas Hoenig warned that OLF funding would give SIFIs a
significant cost of funding advantage, especially during future
financial disruptions:
In times of financial stress, the knowledge that
operating units [of failed SIFIs] will be provided
funding to meet liquidity demands could serve to

Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 1020–21.
Lubben, supra note 64, at 16.
103 See Guynn, supra note 35, at 295–96 (describing how SPOE would provide preferential
treatment for holders of short-term unsecured debt over long-term debtholders); 2013 BPC
SPOE Report, supra note 56, at 27–28, 31, 66, 68–69 (same); infra notes 139–55 and
accompanying text (describing the heavy reliance of SIFIs on short-term debt funding
provided by Wall Street investors, including uninsured depositors and holders of
commercial paper, securities repurchase agreements, and other shadow banking liabilities).
104 Levitin, supra note 65.
101
102

2015]

WALL STREET BAILOUTS

69

encourage corporate treasurers and others to place
their funds with SIFIs’ operating subsidiaries over
other financial firms for whom such assurances are
unavailable. Therefore, this assumption and access to
funding provides SIFIs a significant competitive
advantage.105
FDIC Board Member Jeremiah Norton similarly cautioned that
SPOE could cause “the market equilibrium [to] shift in favor of
[SIFI] subsidiaries” because “creditors of these subsidiaries could
perceive that they would not take a loss upon distress at [a SIFI]
and therefore would require a lower return on transactions or
investments.”106 Thus, Mr. Hoenig and Mr. Norton recognized that
SPOE could perpetuate the TBTF subsidy for SIFIs and their Wall
Street creditors.107
D. SPOE’S CLAIMED BENEFITS ARE HIGHLY DOUBTFUL AND DO NOT
JUSTIFY BLANKET PROTECTION FOR WALL STREET CREDITORS OF
FAILED SIFIS

Advocates for SPOE assert that the strategy has two significant
advantages. First, SPOE could avoid disruptions in financial
markets by preserving a failed SIFI’s operating subsidiaries as
Second, SPOE could reduce cross-border
going concerns.108
conflicts between home country and host country regulators when
a global SIFI fails.109 SPOE would allow the home country
supervisor to maintain control of the parent holding company’s
receivership, and the operating subsidiaries could be kept out of
foreign insolvency proceedings.110 SPOE’s assumed benefits have

105 Joe Adler, Likely Battle Ahead for FDIC’s ‘Single Point’ Resolution Plan, AM. BANKER,
Dec. 11, 2013, 2013 WLNR 30941803 (quoting comments by Mr. Hoenig).
106 Jeremiah D. Norton, Board Member, FDIC, Discussion on the Current State
Resolution Planning, Remarks to the American Bankers Association (Oct. 21, 2013),
available at https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2013/spoct2113.pdf.
107 Adler, supra note 105.
108 See supra notes 39–40, 46 and accompany text.
109 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
110 See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.
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caused many U.S. and foreign regulators to express support for the
strategy.111
It is very doubtful, however, whether SPOE’s claimed
advantages would actually be realized when a SIFI fails. As to the
first alleged benefit, the commencement of an OLA receivership for
a failed SIFI’s parent holding company would likely have serious
and potentially fatal spillover effects on its operating subsidiaries.
Counterparties of subsidiaries might well decide to cut off credit
lines and cancel other contracts instead of waiting to see whether
the subsidiaries could survive as going concerns.112 For example,
after Drexel Burnham Lambert’s holding company declared
bankruptcy in 1990, Drexel’s two broker-dealer subsidiaries could
not obtain even short-term credit from banks or other lenders, and
the Securities and Exchange Commission was forced to place both
broker-dealers in receivership.113 SPOE’s ability to maintain a
failed SIFI’s subsidiaries as going concerns is therefore open to
serious question, especially during a systemic financial crisis.
There is also great uncertainty about SPOE’s ability to promote
cross-border coordination when a global SIFI fails. Despite
intensive efforts by the G20 and the FSB, developed countries
have not agreed on an international framework for resolving global
SIFIs. SPOE can work only with the cooperation of each host
country in which a failed SIFI has a significant presence. For
example, each host country must allow the home country
supervisor to control the resolution of the SIFI’s parent holding

111 See supra notes 38–46, 69–71 and accompanying text (quoting statements of support
for SPOE by FDIC and BoE officials and noting the FSB’s evident agreement with the
concept); Guynn, supra note 35, at 284–86 (citing expressions of support for SPOE by U.S.
and foreign regulators); 2014 Wall Street SPOE Letter, supra note 49, at 7–11 (“The FDIC’s
SPOE Strategy under Title II of Dodd-Frank has been widely praised [by U.S. and foreign
regulators] and developed significant momentum . . . .”).
112 Goodhart & Avgouleas, supra note 68, at 10–12, 34 (describing the potential negative
effects of “the dismemberment of the parent holding company”).
113 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Wal-Mart and the Separation of Banking and Commerce, 39
CONN. L. REV. 1539, 1607 (2007); see also id. at 1606–09 (providing additional examples of
contagion from troubled financial holding companies to their subsidiaries).
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company and must refrain from interfering with the SIFI’s
operating subsidiaries.114
At present, it is highly doubtful whether cross-border
cooperation would be forthcoming if a global SIFI failed. Only a
few nations have adopted SIFI resolution laws comparable to Title
II of Dodd-Frank.115 The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
recently concluded that “as yet, orderly resolution of systemic
cross-border banks is not a feasible option.”116 The IMF warned,
“Should a large cross-border bank fail today, it appears unlikely
that the pitfalls and misaligned incentives that undermined
[international] cooperation in the global financial crisis could be
avoided.”117
Similarly, the FSB recently reported that “most jurisdictions do
not currently have statutory powers to recognise, enforce or give
legal effect to foreign resolution measures.”118 The FSB also
cautioned that “very few jurisdictions currently have [cross-border
resolution] frameworks in place,”119 and “no jurisdiction has
experience” in applying such a framework to accomplish “the
resolution of a complex, cross-border financial group.”120 In the
absence of an effective international regime for resolving global
SIFIs, host countries would likely use “ring-fencing” tactics to
protect their citizens, including segregation and seizure of SIFIowned assets located in their jurisdictions.121
114 Goodhart & Avgouleas, supra note 68, at 33–35, 40–44; Marc Jarsulic & Simon Johnson,
How a Big-Bank Failure Could Unfold, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG (May 23, 2013, 12:01
AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/23/how-a-big-bank-failure-could-unfold/.
115 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-261, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REFORMS:
U.S. AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS’ EFFORTS TO DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT REFORMS, 29–34
(2014), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/662258.pdf.
116 INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND, CROSS-BORDER BANK RESOLUTION: RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS 4 (2014) [hereinafter IMF Bank Resolution Report] (bold type omitted),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/060214.pdf.
117 Id. at 23.
118 FIN. STABILITY BD., CROSS-BORDER RECOGNITION OF RESOLUTION ACTION: CONSULTATIVE
DOCUMENT 3 (2014), available at http://www.financeialstabilityboard.org/publications/c_1409
29.pdf.
119 Id. at 11.
120 Id. at 6.
121 IMF Bank Resolution Report, supra note 116, at 5–7 (“Unilateral responses [by national
authorities] were the norm” in dealing with troubled cross-border SIFIs during the recent
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Thus, SPOE’s claimed advantages are doubtful at best and do
not justify giving blanket protection to Wall Street creditors of
failed SIFIs at the expense of ordinary investors and taxpayers.
As discussed in Part III below, policymakers must adopt reforms
to mitigate the impact of SPOE’s shortcomings if SPOE is chosen
as the preferred strategy for resolving failed SIFIs.
III. POLICYMAKERS SHOULD ADOPT TWO REFORMS TO REDUCE THE
TBTF SUBSIDY EMBODIED IN WALL STREET’S SPOE PLAN
U.S. and foreign regulators have expressed strong support for
SPOE despite its flaws.122 In addition, regulators have not
developed any alternative plan that could liquidate failed SIFIs
during a systemic crisis without disrupting financial markets.123
Nor has Congress acted on legislative proposals that would force
megabanks to become smaller and less complex, thereby removing
(or reducing) the TBTF threat they pose to the financial sector and

financial crisis, “leading in some cases to the breakup of [SIFI] groups into national
components”); id. at 25–29 (noting that France, Belgium and the Netherlands could not agree
on resolution plans for Dexia and Fortis and ultimately broke up both cross-border SIFIs into
separate, nationalized banks); Paul Taylor, European Bank Mergers Still Face Hurdles PostStress Tests, REUTERS, Oct. 12, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/12/us-ecb-banks-t
ests-insight-idUSKCN0I105920141012 (describing “ring-fencing” strategies used by European
bank regulators during the financial crisis and quoting former BoE Governor Mervyn King’s
observation that “global banks are global in life but national in death”).
122 See supra notes 38–46, 69–71, 108–11 and accompanying text. In November 2015,
after the manuscript for this article had been completed, the Federal Reserve Board (Fed)
issued proposed rules that would require parent holding companies of U.S. G-SIBs and U.S.
intermediate holding companies of foreign G-SIBs to maintain minimum levels of qualifying
TLAC, including Tier 1 equity and long-term, bail-in debt. As I have described elsewhere,
the Fed's proposed TLAC rules would (1) entrench SPOE as the chosen strategy for
resolving failed G-SIBs and (2) finance such resolutions by wiping out investments made by
shareholders and bail-in debtholders of the parent holding companies, with OLF loans as
the ultimate backstop. The Fed’s proposed TLAC rules would ensure that operating
subsidiaries of failed G-SIBs and their creditors would receive full protection, while most or
all of the resolution costs would be borne by ordinary investors and taxpayers. See Arthur
E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Fed’s TLAC Proposal Would Impose the Costs of Resolving Failed
Megabanks on Ordinary Investors and Taxpayers, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (forthcoming Dec.
2015).
123 Lubben, supra note 64, at 13–14; Skeel, supra note 64, at 2–3, 9–10.
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the economy.124 It therefore appears likely that regulators will
adopt SPOE as their preferred approach for resolving failed SIFIs.
If SPOE becomes the primary roadmap for OLA resolutions,
policymakers must adopt two reforms that would force SIFIs and
their insiders to internalize at least some of the costs of the
systemic risks they create. First, SIFIs should pay risk-adjusted
premiums to prefund the OLF. Those premiums should include
fees on uninsured deposits and short-term shadow banking
liabilities held by SIFIs. Second, SIFIs should pay at least half of
their total compensation to senior executives and other key
employees in the form of CoCos.
A. SIFIS SHOULD PAY RISK-ADJUSTED PREMIUMS TO PREFUND OLF

1. Prefunding OLF Would Reduce the TBTF Subsidy for SIFIs.
I and other scholars have argued that Congress should require
SIFIs to pay risk-adjusted premiums to prefund the OLF.125 This
reform is urgently needed to correct a serious flaw in Dodd-Frank.
124 In 2010 the Senate rejected the Brown-Kaufman amendment, which would have imposed
maximum size limits on banks and thereby mandated a breakup of the six largest U.S. banks.
Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 1055 n.454. Congress has also failed to adopt either
(1) a Senate bill introduced in July 2013, which would reestablish the Glass-Steagall Act’s
mandatory separation between commercial banks and securities firms, or (2) another Senate
bill introduced in April 2013, which would require SIFIs to hold much higher levels of equity
capital and to stop using deposits from their FDIC-insured banks to subsidize the activities of
their nonbank affiliates. See Peter Eavis, Senators Introduce Bill to Separate Trading
Activities from Big Banks, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2013, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/07/11/
senators-introduce-bill-to-separate-trading-activities-from-big-banks/ (discussing the “21st
Century Glass-Steagall Act” introduced by Senators Maria Cantwell, Angus King, John
McCain, and Elizabeth Warren); Wilmarth, Blind Eye, supra note 1, at 1440–44 (discussing
the bill introduced by Senators Sherrod Brown and David Vitter in April 2013).
125 See, e.g., Viral V. Acharya et al., Taxing Systemic Risk, in REGULATING WALL STREET:
THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE 121, 137–40 (Viral
V. Acharya et al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter REGULATING WALL STREET] (“[S]ystemically
important financial institutions need to internalize the systemic risk costs they imposed on
the financial system.”); Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial
Crisis: Dodd-Frank’s Dangers and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28
YALE J. REG. 151, 154 (2011) (proposing a systemic risk insurance fund that would compel
SIFIs to internalize the potential costs of their failure ); Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note
1, at 1015–23, 1049–50 (proposing that the FDIC should require SIFIs to pay risk-adjusted
premiums to prefund the OLF); Wilmarth, Two-Tiered System, supra note 1, at 358–63
(presenting an updated proposal for prefunding the OLF).
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As discussed above, Dodd-Frank established the OLF to provide
funding for the FDIC’s liquidation of failed SIFIs, but Wall Street
blocked legislative proposals that would have compelled SIFIs to
pay premiums to prefund the OLF.126
Consequently, the OLF has a zero balance, and the FDIC will
be obliged to impose retroactive assessments on large financial
institutions to cover unpaid balances on OLF loans after resolving
failed SIFIs. As previously shown, the FDIC would likely forebear
from imposing assessments on surviving megabanks during a
financial crisis.127 OLF borrowings would therefore remain unpaid
until long after the crisis had passed.128
Thus, taxpayers will almost certainly be forced to underwrite
resolutions of failed SIFIs via long-term OLF loans.
The
availability of OLF loans allows SIFIs to obtain short-term funding
at artificially low, government-subsidized rates because short-term
creditors of SIFIs expect to be fully protected during any future
SPOE resolution. A prefunded OLF would shrink this subsidy for
SIFIs and their creditors.129
I have proposed that banking firms with assets exceeding $100
billion, together with nonbank financial companies designated as
SIFIs under Dodd-Frank, should pay risk-adjusted premiums to
prefund the OLF, over a period of several years, at a minimum
level of $300 billion.130 That level is justified by the fact that
Treasury provided $290 billion of capital assistance to the
nineteen largest banks and AIG during the recent financial
crisis.131 Each SIFI should pay risk-adjusted OLF premiums that
reflect its contribution to systemic risk, based on factors such as
size, complexity, opacity, leverage, liquidity, volatility of earnings,
and interconnectedness with other large financial institutions.132
See supra notes 6–8, 92–101 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 93–101.
128 See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text.
129 See supra notes 102–06 and accompanying text; Wilmarth, Two-Tiered System, supra
note 1, at 358–60 (“A prefunded OLF is essential to shrink the TBTF subsidy for [SIFIs].”).
130 Wilmarth, Two-Tiered System, supra note 1, at 360.
131 Id.
132 See Acharya et al., supra note 125, at 124, 138 (describing a multi-factor approach for
determining each SIFI’s contribution to aggregate systemic risk); Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank,
126
127
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Thus, OLF premiums should require each SIFI to “internalize”
the systemic risk costs that it creates.133 The FDIC should use
OLF premiums to cover losses from resolving a SIFI that remain
unpaid after the FDIC has written off investments made by
shareholders, holders of subordinated debt, and qualifying holders
of bail-in bonds. If the FDIC uses OLF premiums to cover such
losses, the FDIC should impose additional risk-adjusted premiums
on large financial institutions to replenish the OLF.134
Requiring SIFIs to prefund the OLF would have several highly
desirable outcomes. First, a prefunded OLF would help to protect
Treasury and taxpayers from bearing the costs of resolving failed
SIFIs. Second, a well-designed, risk-adjusted schedule for OLF
premiums should encourage SIFIs to reduce their risks by
following more prudent business strategies, maintaining stronger
capital and liquidity positions, and adopting simpler, less complex
business structures. Third, SIFIs would have strong incentives to
monitor other megabanks and alert regulators when they observe
aggressive risk-taking by their peers. Each SIFI would know that
the failure of a peer institution would be likely to trigger
additional OLF assessments.135 Fourth, a prefunded OLF would
reduce the funding burden on prudent SIFIs by forcing high-risk
megabanks to pay at least some OLF premiums before they fail.136
Fifth, a prefunded OLF would encourage regulators to resolve
failed SIFIs promptly. A prefunded OLF would give the FDIC
greater resources to resolve failed SIFIs without exposing
taxpayers to the costs of OLF loans. In contrast, the presently
unfunded OLF encourages regulators to delay putting troubled
SIFIs into OLA receiverships in order to postpone (and hopefully
avoid) the unpopular step of using taxpayer-backed OLF loans to
finance the resolutions.137 For all of the above reasons, a
supra note 1, at 1021–22 (proposing that the OLF premiums paid by each SIFI should be
based on various factors related to systemic risk).
133 Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 1021–22. For a proposed methodology for
measuring and taxing systemic risk, see Acharya et al., supra note 125, at 124–31, 138–40.
134 Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 1019–20.
135 Id. at 1021.
136 Id.
137 Wilmarth, Two-Tiered System, supra note 1, at 362.
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prefunded OLF would reduce the TBTF subsidy that otherwise
would grow even larger under Wall Street’s SPOE plan.
2.
OLF Premiums Should Include Fees on Short-Term
Liabilities Held by SIFIs. If regulators embrace SPOE with its
guaranteed protection for short-term creditors of SIFIs, they must
require SIFIs to pay for that protection.138 Accordingly, each
SIFI’s OLF premiums should include fees on its short-term
liabilities. Those fees should be comparable to risk-based deposit
insurance premiums and should be assessed on uninsured deposits
and other short-term liabilities held by SIFIs and their operating
subsidiaries.
SIFIs rely on cheap funding from government-subsidized, shortterm liabilities to finance their speculative activities in the capital
markets.139 During the credit boom leading up to the financial
crisis, megabanks expected that governments would protect all of
their depositors (insured and uninsured) in order to preserve
financial stability.
Regulators fulfilled that expectation by
providing bailouts that rescued failing megabanks and protected
all of their depositors.140 SIFIs continue to rely on low-cost
deposits to finance their capital markets activities.141
SIFIs also draw much of their short-term funding from shadow
banking liabilities, including commercial paper, securities
repurchase agreements (repos), and various types of asset-backed
Those instruments function as “shadow bank
securities.142
deposits” because they are “expected to be available on demand

138 See Levitin, supra note 65 (“If there’s going to be a guarantee [for short-term liabilities
of SIFIs under SPOE], it needs to be explicit and priced.”).
139 See Wilmarth, Two-Tiered System, supra note 1, at 331–32 (explaining that WallStreet mounted a successful campaign to repeal the Lincoln Amendment to Dodd-Frank
because SIFIs were determined to maintain their ability to conduct high-risk derivatives
activities within their subsidiary banks so that they could “keep exploiting the cheap
funding” provided by bank deposits).
140 Viral V. Acharya et al., A Bird’s Eye View: The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, in REGULATING WALL STREET, supra note 125, at 1, 2–5. See
generally JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 86; Wilmarth, Two-Tiered System, supra note 1.
141 See Wilmarth, Two-Tiered System, supra note 1, at 350–52, 368–69 (describing the
reliance of megabanks on low-cost deposits).
142 Pozsar et al., supra note 9, at 11–17, 22–32, 48–52.
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and [paid] at par.”143 Shadow banking liabilities allow megabanks
to obtain low-cost funding while avoiding deposit insurance
premiums and, in some cases, higher capital requirements.144
Indeed, repos have provided a cheaper source of funding than bank
deposits during the past several years.145
Investors in shadow banking liabilities include wealthy
individuals, hedge funds, mutual funds, insurance companies,
corporations, municipalities, and other institutional investors.146
Many of those investors have close connections to Wall Street
megabanks.147 The financial crisis “demonstrated that shadow
banking creates new channels of contagion and systemic risk
transmission between traditional banks and the capital
markets.”148 For example, about 90% of the assets of “prime”
money market mutual funds (MMMFs) consist of short-term
liabilities issued by financial institutions, including “commercial
paper, structured securities, bank obligations, and repurchase
agreements.”149
During the financial crisis, markets for commercial paper and
repos froze, and many MMMFs experienced runs by investors.150
To prevent a collapse of the financial system, federal agencies
established a wide array of emergency programs to protect shadow
Id. at 52.
Id. at 11–14, 22–30.
145 Eric S. Rosengren, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Res. Bank of Boston, BrokerDealer Finance and Financial Stability, Keynote Remarks at the Conference on the Risks of
Wholesale Funding, available at https://www.bostonfed.org/news/speeches/rosengren/2014/
081314/081314text.pdf (referring to Figure 10 in the accompanying presentation, which is
available at http://www.bostonfed.org/news/speeches/rosengren/2014/081314figuresandcom
ments.pdf); see also id. at 8–10 (referring to Figures 6 and 8, which show that securities
broker-dealers, including subsidiaries of universal banks, raise about half of their funding
through repos).
146 BLINDER, supra note 1, at 59–60; Poszar et al., supra note 9, at 46–54; see also Viral V.
Acharya & T. Sabri Öncü, The Repurchase Agreement (Repo) Market, in REGULATING WALL
STREET, supra note 125, at 319, 322 (listing major participants in the repo market).
147 Tobias Adrian & Adam B. Ashcraft, Shadow Banking Regulation, 4 ANN. REV. FIN.
ECON. 99, 100 (2012) (“The operations of many shadow banking vehicles and activities are
symbiotically intertwined with traditional banking and insurance institutions.”).
148 Id.
149 Marcin Kacperczyk & Philipp Schnabl, How Safe Are Money Market Funds?, 2013 Q. J.
ECON. 1081 (noting that “prime” MMMFs hold assets other than government securities).
150 Id. at 1083–90; Acharya &
ncü, supra note 146, at 332–40.
143
144
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banking creditors, including loans, guarantees, and asset
purchases, which collectively provided a “360° backstop” for
shadow banking liabilities.151 For example, Treasury guaranteed
MMMF investors against further losses, the FDIC guaranteed new
issuances of debt by financial holding companies, and the Federal
Reserve System (Fed) purchased commercial paper and made
Those federal programs pledged
loans to broker-dealers.152
trillions of dollars to protect short-term creditors of large financial
institutions, thereby serving as “modern-day equivalents of deposit
insurance” for shadow banking liabilities.153
HSBC chairman Douglas Flint recently acknowledged that
universal banks received an “implicit subsidy” during the financial
crisis “[b]ecause investment banking operations were alongside
society’s deposits, [and] there was an implicit underwriting of all
the debt within the operation because one would not risk the
systemic panic that would happen if people thought their deposits
were at risk . . . .”154 FDIC Vice Chair Thomas Hoenig has warned
that universal banks continue to exploit the federal government’s
“safety net subsidy” by combining commercial banking with capital
markets activities and by relying on “wholesale funding markets”
that are “major sources of volatility in times of financial stress.”155
SPOE would perpetuate that subsidy by protecting short-term
liabilities issued by SIFIs and their operating subsidiaries.
As part of their OLF premiums, SIFIs should pay fees on their
uninsured deposits and other short-term liabilities. Those fees
should be comparable to risk-based deposit insurance premiums
and should reflect the credit, liquidity, and market risks inherent

Pozsar et al., supra note 9, at 59–64.
Id. at 61–64; BLINDER, supra note 1, at 144–49, 161–62; JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note
86, at 157–64.
153 Pozsar et al., supra note 9, at 64; see also JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 86, at 157–74
(describing the emergency programs as “blank checks” for “bailing out Wall Street,” and noting
that “the special inspector general for [the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)] estimated a
total potential support package of $23.7 trillion, or over 150 percent of U.S. GDP”).
154 2014 Flint Testimony, supra note 83.
155 Thomas M. Hoenig, Vice Chair, FDIC, Can We End Financial Bailouts?, Address to the
Boston Economic Club 7 (May 7, 2014), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/
spmay0714a.pdf.
151
152
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in each SIFI’s short-term liabilities.156 The FDIC should monitor
changes in short-term funding strategies used by SIFIs, and the
FDIC should impose fees on new types of short-term liabilities that
serve as substitutes for deposits, commercial paper, or repos.157
Requiring SIFIs to pay fees on their short-term liabilities would
help to shrink their TBTF subsidy. Those fees would (1) force
SIFIs to internalize risks created by those liabilities, (2) encourage
SIFIs to adopt more stable, longer-term funding strategies that
reduce their reliance on volatile, short-term liabilities, and (3) help
to prefund OLF, thereby improving the FDIC’s ability to resolve
failed SIFIs without relying on taxpayer-backed loans.158
B. SIFIS SHOULD PAY AT LEAST HALF OF THEIR COMPENSATION TO
SENIOR EXECUTIVES AND OTHER KEY INSIDERS IN THE FORM OF
COCOS

1. Universal Banks Provide Extraordinary Benefits to Insiders
at the Expense of Taxpayers and Society. As shown above,
universal banks rely on subsidized, low-cost funding from deposits
and shadow banking liabilities to finance their capital markets
activities, including underwriting, market making, and trading in
securities and derivatives.159 Most of the largest global banks
have adopted the universal banking model as their favored
156 See CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 22, at 500–01 (describing the FDIC’s riskbased deposit insurance premiums).
157 See Tracy Alloway, Meet the New Shadow Bank (It’s a Lot Like the Old Shadow Bank),
BLOOMBERG, June 17, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-17/meet-thenew-shadow-bank-it-s-a-lot-like-the-old-shadow-bank- (reporting that financial institutions
were creating “a host of new vehicles” in order “to fill the hole left by . . . a shrinking repo
market”).
158 See Acharya & Öncü, supra note 146, at 343–44 (discussing proposals to require
issuers of repos to pay fees similar to deposit insurance premiums); Adrian & Ashcraft,
supra note 147, at 130–32 (describing proposals to require issuers of MMMFs to pay
assessments to create an “ex ante buffer” to protect their investors).
159 See supra Part III.A.2. Megabanks receive additional benefits from the preferential
treatment given to repos and derivatives under the Bankruptcy Code and statutes
governing insolvencies of banks and SIFIs. Large universal banks are the primary
beneficiaries of that preferential treatment because they are leading issuers of repos and
dominant dealers in derivatives. For discussions of this topic, which is beyond the scope of
this Article, see generally CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 22, at 506-07; Wilmarth,
Blind Eye, supra note 1, at 1361–62 and sources cited therein.
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business strategy.160 The universal banking model creates a
strong likelihood that serious problems occurring in one sector of
the financial industry will spill over into other sectors and trigger
a systemic crisis, as occurred during 2007–2009. To stop the
spread of contagion, governments provided trillions of dollars of
assistance to protect depositors and shadow banking creditors of
universal banks.161
In addition to their huge systemic risks, universal banks have
performed very poorly during the past decade, even after receiving
massive benefits from their TBTF subsidy.162 As a prominent
financial magazine recently stated, “It is hard to avoid the
conclusion
that
global
banks
are . . . dysfunctional
conglomerates.”163 A prominent columnist for a leading financial
160 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 86, at 208–09; see also Christine Harper, Breaking up Big
Banks Hard to Do as Market Forces Fail, BLOOMBERG, June 27, 2012, http://www.bl
oomberg.com/news/articles/2012-06-27/breaking-up-big-banks-hard-to-do-as-market-forces-fail
(explaining that large global banks have embraced the universal banking model); Kushal
Balluck, Bank of Eng., Investment Banking: Linkages to the Real Economy and the Financial
System, Q. BULL., 2015 Q1, at 1, 2, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/q
uarterlybulletin/2015/ q1prerelease_2.pdf (“[M]ost [global banks] operate a universal banking
model, providing other retail and corporate banking services—such as accepting deposits,
making loans and facilitating payments—alongside their investment banking activities.”).
161 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 86, at 120–21, 174; Balluck supra note 160, at 2, 9–11;
Matthew Richardson, Roy C. Smith & Ingo Walter, Large Banks and the Volcker Rule, in
REGULATING WALL STREET, supra note 125, at 181, 181–84, 190–96; Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank,
supra note 1, at 963–67, 977–87; see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the
U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975–2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased
Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 451–76 (warning of the risks of universal banks several years
before the financial crisis occurred).
162 E.g., Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Citigroup: A Case Study in Managerial and Regulatory
Failures, 47 IND. L. REV. 69, 70–72, 132–37 (2014) [hereinafter Wilmarth, Citigroup];
Wilmarth, Two-Tiered System, supra note 1, at 368–69, 369 n.518; Harper, supra note 160;
Cocking up All Over the World, ECONOMIST, Mar. 7, 2015 [hereinafter Global Banks], http://
www.economist.com/node/21645731/; Oliver Ralph, Lex In-Depth: Universal Banks, FIN.
TIMES, Mar. 29, 2015, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a21b7454-d243-11e4-ae91-00144feab7de.
html#slide0; see also Michael J. Moore, Yalman Onaran & Nicholas Comfort, Biggest Global
Banks Shrink Under Pressure from Regulators, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 27, 2015, http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-27/biggest-global-banks-go-to-pieces-under–pressu
re-from-regulators (reporting that average returns on assets at ten of the largest global banks
declined from 0.81% in 2006 to 0.22% in 2014).
163 Global Banks, supra note 162; see also The Fall of the Universal Bank, ECONOMIST,
Nov. 21, 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21566439/print (“The promise of the crossselling financial supermarket has long been eclipsed by the destruction of shareholder value
after the crash.”).
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newspaper similarly declared, “The universal banking model is
broken . . . .”164
Despite the woeful performance of global megabanks, their top
executives are determined to preserve the universal banking
model.165 Their attitude is not surprising, since large financial
conglomerates have provided immense benefits to senior
executives and other key employees (including traders).
Compensation in the financial industry rose rapidly between 1980
and 2006, as banks became larger and more complex, and in 2006
financial sector compensation reached its highest level (compared
with pay in other industries) since the early 1930s.166 Top
executives of megabanks prospered even as their shareholders
received lackluster or negative returns.167 Meanwhile, taxpayers
Ralph, supra note 162.
Peter Coy, The Biggest Banks Aren’t Ready to Shrink, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 5, 2015, http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-05/bank-capital-rules-would-smaller-banks-reallybe-safer- (reporting that “most of the biggest global banks,” including JPMorgan Chase and
Goldman Sachs, “are fighting to stay big and important”); Ben McLannahan, BofA Says It Is
Not ‘Too Big to Manage,” FIN. TIMES, May 6, 2015, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/12a73710-f
410-11e4-bd16-00144feab7de.html#axzz3tUMKjvqi (quoting assertion by Bank of America
Chair & CEO Brian Moynihan, that the bank’s “integrated model” produces “significant
benefits” through “diversification of earnings streams, cost synergies and cheap funding”);
Nathaniel Popper, JPMorgan Chase Insists It’s Worth More as One Than in Pieces, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 24, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/25/business/dealbook/jpmorgan-pushe
s-back-against-suggestion-of-split.html?_r=0 (reporting on efforts by JPMorgan Chase Chair
Jamie Dimon to preserve his bank’s “basic model of providing the full range of financial
services around the globe”).
166 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 86, at 58–61; Thomas Philippon & Ariell Reshef, Wages
and Human Capital in the U.S. Financial Industry: 1909–2006, at 3–4, 16–22, 30 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14644, 2009); Wilmarth, Blind Eye, supra
note 1, at 1406–07, 1420–21.
167 See Wilmarth, Citigroup, supra note 162, at 87–88, 114–17 (noting that Citigroup’s senior
executives received very high compensation, including almost $1 billion paid to Sandy Weill,
while Citigroup’s shareholders suffered huge losses between 2003 and 2012); Harper, supra
note 160 (describing the disparity between high compensation paid to top executives at Bank
of America and Citigroup and the banks’ underperforming stock prices, which were both
trading below book value); Michael J. Moore, JPMorgan Worth One-Third More in Break-Up,
Mayo Says, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 27, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-02-27/
jpmorgan-would-be-worth-more-if-split-up-mayo (quoting a research report by Michael Mayo,
who observed that JPMorgan Chase’s stock price declined by 2% between 2004 and 2011,
while the bank’s top five executives received “over $600 million of compensation”); Hugh Son &
Pamela Roux, Jamie Dimon Is Now a Billionaire, and He Got There in an Unusual Way,
BLOOMBERG, June 3, 2015, http://www.bloomberg. com/news/articles/2015-06-03/jamie-dimonbecomes-billionaire-ushering-in-era-of-the-megabank-iagiwwl8 (reporting that Sandy Weill
164
165
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and society incurred tremendous costs when financial markets
froze and governments were forced to bail out SIFIs and their
creditors during the financial crisis.168
Perverse incentives in megabanks’ compensation plans help to
explain the stark disparity between insiders’ extraordinary gains
and outsiders’ huge losses. SIFIs promised very large rewards to
senior executives and other key insiders if they met short-term
profit goals.169 Those rewards encouraged speculative bets that
produced short-term earnings and bonuses for insiders but later
inflicted gigantic losses on ordinary investors, the deposit
insurance fund, taxpayers, and society.170 Compensation policies
that encouraged excessive risk-taking were especially dangerous
at megabanks, given their highly-leveraged capital structures and
their reliance on explicit and implicit safety net subsidies.171
Many analysts and regulators agree that executive compensation
policies at SIFIs must be reformed to remove incentives for shortterm gambling.172
and Jamie Dimon both became billionaires while building universal banks at Citigroup and
JPMorgan Chase).
168 See Wilmarth, Blind Eye, supra note 1, at 1312–17 (listing some of the enormous costs of
the financial crisis); Wilmarth, Two-Tiered System, supra note 1, at 257–67 (describing the
federal government’s massive assistance to the largest financial institutions during the crisis).
169 BLINDER, supra note 1, at 81–84, 283–85, 297; JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 86, at 58–
61, 115–16; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J.
247, 249–74 (2010); John McCormack & Judy Weiker, Rethinking “Strength of Incentives”
for Executives of Financial Institutions, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Summer 2010, at 65, 66–69;
Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring Executive Compensation for Risk
Regulation, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1205, 1216–23 (2011); Wilmarth, Citigroup, supra note 162,
at 99, 104–05, 114–19.
170 See supra notes 166–69 and accompanying text (describing how bank compensation
systems encouraged risk-taking, which eventually led to huge government bailouts).
171 Rosalind L. Bennett et al., Inside Debt, Bank Default Risk, and Performance During the
Crisis 2–3 (FDIC Ctr. for Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 2012-3, 2014), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2122619; McCormack & Weiker, supra note 169, at 66; Tung, supra note
169, at 1210–16; Sjoerd van Bekkum, Inside Debt and Bank Risk, J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS (forthcoming) (manuscript at 3–4), available at http://ssrn.com/abs tract=1682139;
Wilmarth, Two-Tiered System, supra note 1, at 363 n.498.
172 See supra notes 169, 171, infra notes 173–77 and accompanying text (describing
studies showing that equity-based compensation incentives encouraged disastrous shortterm risk-taking by insiders at large banks, while debt-based compensation plans motivated
executives to adopt sustainable long-term business strategies that were less risky and
better aligned with the interests of creditors).
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2. SIFIs Should Pay Much of Their Compensation to Insiders in
the Form of CoCos. To change the incentives for insiders at
megabanks, regulators should compel SIFIs to adopt compensation
policies that include smaller equity-based incentives and a much
larger focus on long-term debt. During the period leading up to
the financial crisis, large banks assumed greater risks and
suffered bigger losses if their executive compensation plans
included strong equity-based incentives.173 Executives at those
institutions
made
aggressive
acquisitions,
expanded
nontraditional, fee-based businesses (including investment
banking), and acquired large amounts of subprime mortgagebacked securities.174
In contrast, banks that issued larger amounts of long-term debt
to their top executives performed significantly better during the
financial crisis and had a substantially lower risk of default.175
Long-term debt compensation for executives (inside debt) includes
pension rights and deferred compensation rights, which are
“typically unfunded and unsecured” and therefore “face default
risk just as outside creditors do.”176 Executives holding a higher
proportion of inside debt in relation to their equity interests had
173 Jens Hagendorff & Francesco Vallascas, CEO Pay Incentives and Risk-Taking: Evidence
from Bank Acquisitions, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 1078, 1078–79 (2011); see also authorities cited infra
in note 174.
174 Robert DeYoung et al., Executive Compensation and Business Policy Choices at U.S.
Commercial Banks, 48 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 165, 166–68, 175, 177, 180–83,
189, 192–95 (2013); Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & René M. Stulz, Bank CEO Incentives and the
Credit Crisis, 99 J. FIN. ECON. 11, 12–13, 24–25 (2011); Hagendorff & Vallascas, supra note
173, at 1079–80, 1084–86, 1091–94; Bennett et al., supra note 171, at 1–6, 19–24, 36–37; see
also Sanjai Bhagat & Brian Bolton, Misaligned Bank Executive Incentive Compensation, 1–
6, 13–14, 17–33 (June 11, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2277917 (analyzing executive compensation plans at fourteen of the largest U.S.
financial institutions between 2000 and 2008, and finding that (1) those fourteen
institutions provided much larger amounts of equity-based pay to their chief executive
officers, compared with thirty-seven smaller banks that did not receive TARP assistance;
and (2) the same fourteen institutions incurred much greater risks and performed much
worse during the financial crisis, compared with the group of thirty-seven smaller banks).
175 Bennett et al., supra note 171, at 3–6, 19–24, 34–37; Bekkum, supra note 171
(manuscript at 4–7, 17–26, 30–31); Frederick Tung & Xue Wang, Bank CEOs, Inside Debt
Compensation, and the Global Financial Crisis 3–5, 22–29 (B. U. Sch. of Law, Working
Paper No. 11-49, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1570161.
176 Tung & Wang, supra note 175, at 1, 6–7.
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incentives that were more aligned with long-term creditors and
therefore adopted lower-risk business strategies prior to the
financial crisis.177
The foregoing evidence supports the view that key insiders at
SIFIs (including senior executives, traders and risk managers)
should receive a large portion of their compensation in the form of
long-term debt. I have previously argued that SIFIs should pay at
least half of the total compensation for key insiders in the form of
CoCos.178 CoCos for key insiders should be converted into common
stock upon the occurrence of a designated event of financial stress,
including (1) a decline in capital below a specified level or (2) the
initiation of an OLA receivership, a bankruptcy, or another
insolvency proceeding for a SIFI or one of its principal operating
subsidiaries. The Fed, as the primary supervisor of the SIFI’s
parent holding company, should have the authority to activate any
pre-insolvency trigger for financial distress.
Key insiders of SIFIs should be barred from making any
voluntary conversions of their CoCos into common stock until
three to five years after their employment ends. In addition, after
voluntary conversions occur, insiders should be required to spread
their sales of common stock over an additional period of similar
length. Insiders should also be prohibited from using derivatives
or other instruments to hedge their exposure to CoCos or common
stock issuable upon conversion of CoCos.
A lengthy post-employment holding period for CoCos and a
further deferral period for sales of common stock issued upon
voluntary conversions of CoCos would discourage insiders from
making high-risk gambles to boost the value of their equity-based
compensation or the voluntary conversion option for their CoCos.
Insiders would know that their CoCos would be automatically
converted into common stock upon the occurrence of a designated
triggering event indicating financial distress. Any common stock
See Bennett et al., supra note 171, at 36.
See supra notes 76–81 and accompanying text (discussing CoCos). The following
description of my proposal to require SIFIs to pay much of their executive compensation in
the form of CoCos is adapted from Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 1008–09, and
Wilmarth, Two-Tiered System, supra note 1, at 365–67.
177
178
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received upon mandatory conversion would likely have little or no
value. Thus, CoCos would be a far more effective way of
discouraging excessive risk-taking by insiders compared with
complicated clawback provisions in employment contracts.179
Requiring key insiders to receive at least half of their total
compensation in the form of CoCos, and to hold those CoCos (and
any resulting common stock) for several years after their
employment, would give them powerful incentives to adopt
business strategies that are consistent with the interests of longterm creditors, the deposit insurance fund, the OLF, and
taxpayers. CoCos would ensure that (1) insiders would not receive
a significant portion of their compensation unless their
organization achieves long-term success, and (2) insiders would
bear a fair share of the losses if their institution encounters severe
financial distress during their employment or within several years
thereafter.180
Section 956(b) of Dodd-Frank requires federal regulators to
issue rules barring incentive-based compensation plans that
encourage “inappropriate” risk-taking by financial institutions.181
Regulators have not yet adopted final rules to implement Section
956(b), even though Dodd-Frank established a deadline of April
2011 for that action.182 Regulators should promptly issue final
rules that would carry out the intent of Section 956(b) by
incorporating the CoCo compensation plan for SIFIs described
above.183

179 Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 1008–09; Wilmarth Two-Tier System, supra
note 1, at 365–67. For similar proposals to use CoCos to improve the incentives of key
insiders of SIFIs, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance
in Financial Firms: The Case for Convertible Equity-Based Pay 8–14 (Ctr. for Law & Econ.
Studies, Columbia Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 373, 2010), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1633906; Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation,
69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1821, 1854–72 (2012).
180 Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 1009.
181 Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 956(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1905 (2010).
182 Wilmarth, Two-Tiered System, supra note 1, at 367 & n.517.
183 Id. at 367–68.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The high-risk business model of universal banks was an
important cause of the financial crisis. Universal banks rely on
cheap funding from government-subsidized deposits and shadow
banking liabilities to finance their speculative activities in the
capital markets. By combining deposit-taking and lending with
underwriting, market making, and trading in securities and
derivatives, the universal banking model creates a strong
likelihood that problems occurring in one sector of the financial
industry will spread to other sectors. To prevent such contagion,
federal regulators have powerful incentives to intervene during
any serious disruption to protect universal banks and their
depositors and short-term creditors. The support expressed by
regulators for Wall Street’s SPOE plan is a natural outgrowth of
those incentives.
Wall Street’s SPOE plan would guarantee future bailouts for
Wall Street creditors while imposing losses from resolving failed
SIFIs on ordinary investors and taxpayers. Wall Street’s SPOE
plan would also ensure that a failed SIFI would emerge from OLA
with minimal structural changes. Thus, Wall Street’s version of
SPOE would preserve TBTF treatment for SIFIs and their Wall
Street creditors. In a future crisis, ordinary citizens would be
expected once again—whether as investors in bail-in bonds or as
taxpayers—to rescue Wall Street from its reckless gambling.
Wall Street’s SPOE plan is part of its broader campaign to
defend the universal banking model. That business model has
provided extraordinary benefits to insiders of SIFIs at the expense
of ordinary investors, taxpayers, and society. A straightforward
policy response would be to break up SIFIs by imposing maximum
size limits or by requiring functional separation similar to the
Glass-Steagall Act.184 However, Congress has declined to adopt
either approach.185
184 See supra notes 5, 124 (describing proposals to impose maximum size limits on
financial institutions and to enact a modern version of the Glass-Steagall Act).
185 See supra note 124 (discussing Congress’ failure to adopt either reform).
As an
alternative remedy, I have proposed “narrow banking” reforms that would reduce
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Despite SPOE’s serious flaws, U.S. and foreign regulators
appear likely to adopt SPOE as their preferred strategy for
resolving failed SIFIs. If SPOE does become the preferred
approach, policymakers should adopt two reforms to reduce
SPOE’s subsidy for SIFIs and their insiders. First, SIFIs should
pay risk-adjusted premiums (including fees on their uninsured
deposits and short-term shadow banking liabilities) to prefund the
OLF. Second, SIFIs should pay at least half of their total
compensation for key insiders in the form of CoCos that are
subject to lengthy post-employment holding periods.
The foregoing reforms would not eliminate the TBTF subsidy
for megabanks. Those reforms, however, would compel SIFIs and
their insiders to internalize at least some of the costs of the
systemic risks they impose on society. Requiring SIFIs and their
insiders to absorb those costs would encourage them to follow more
sustainable, long-term business policies, and would also support
current efforts by regulators to persuade SIFIs to reduce their size
and complexity.186

government subsidies for SIFIs and increase market pressures for voluntary breakups by
(1) establishing strict legal firewalls between banking and nonbanking subsidiaries of
SIFIs, and (2) prohibiting SIFIs from using deposits from their “narrow banks” to finance
their nonbanking activities. Wilmarth, Two-Tiered System, supra note 1, at 342–63.
186 See Moore, Onaran & Comfort, supra note 162 (reporting that U.S. and foreign regulators
have imposed tougher capital rules, stress tests, liquidity requirements, and resolution
planning standards to encourage megabanks to become smaller and less complex).

